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Abstract
It is known that if a capacity is convex then the Dempster−Shafer update rule for the capacity
is equivalent to the maximum likelihood update rule for the core of the capacity. This paper
shows that the converse is also true; that is, a capacity must be convex if these two rules are
equivalent.
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The Dempster-Shafer update rule (Dempster, 1967; Shafer, 1976) is one of the plausible
update rules for non-additive probability measures or capacities.1 The maximum likeli-
hood update rule, on the other hand, is one of the plausible update rules for collections
of probability measures. Gibloa and Schmeidler (1993) have shown that if a capacity
is convex then the Dempster-Shafer update rule for the capacity is equivalent to the
maximum likelihood update rule for the core of the capacity in the following sense:2 the
Dempster-Shafer updated capacity is the lower envelope of probabilities obtained by the
maximum likelihood update rule.
This paper considers the converse and oﬀers a characterization of convex capacities
through update rules. The main result establishes that the equivalence of the two update
rules implies convexity of the underlying capacity. Thus, a capacity is convex if and
only if the Dempster-Shafer update rule for the capacity is equivalent to the maximum
likelihood update rule for the core of the capacity. Technically, we exploit Shapley’s
characterization of cores of convex games, which is reviewed in section 2. The main
result is given in section 3.
2 Core of convex games
Let (Ω,F) be a measurable space where F is an algebra on Ω. A function v : F → R
with v(∅) = 0 is called a game. A game v : F → R is convex if
v(S) + v(T) ≤ v(S ∪ T) + v(S ∩ T) for all S,T ∈ F.
A game v is additive if the above inequality is always satisﬁed as an equality, and we
refer to an additive game as a measure. Let v0 : 2Ω → R be the conjugate of v, i.e.,
v0(E) = v(Ω) − v(Ω\E) for all E ∈ F where Sc = Ω\S.
We denote by C(v) the core of v:
C(v) = {p : p is a measure with p(Ω) = v(Ω) and p(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ F}.
For each E ∈ F, deﬁne
CE(v) = {p ∈ C(v) : p(E) = v(E)}.
1Further elaborations have been done by various authors. See for instance Wakker (2000) and its
references. Preference based characterizations have also been studied: see Gibloa and Schmeidler (1993),
Chateauneuf et al. (2001), and Wang (2003).
2Denneberg (1994) gave an alternative proof.
1Note that CΩ(v) = C;(v) = C(v).
In general, C(v) may be empty, and even if C(v) is non-empty, CE(v) may be empty.
It is well known that if a game is convex then CE(v)  = ∅ for all E ∈ F, or equivalently,
v(E) = minp2C(v) p(E) for all E ∈ F, but not vice versa. So a stronger condition is
equivalent to convexity, as shown in the following characterization result due to Shapley
(1971) for a ﬁnite space3 and Schmeidler (1984) for an inﬁnite space.
Proposition 1 A game v is convex if and only if, for any increasing sequence S1 ⊆
S2 ⊆ ··· ⊆ Sn ⊆ Ω with S1,S2,...,Sn ∈ F, we have
CS1 ∩ CS2 ∩ ··· ∩ CSn  = ∅.
A simple modiﬁcation yields the following lemma.
Lemma 2 A game v is convex if and only if, for any S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ Ω with S1,S2 ∈ F, we
have
CS1 ∩ CS2  = ∅.
Proof. It is enough to show the “if” part. For S,T ∈ F, let S1 = S ∩T and S2 = S ∪T.
Then, S1 ⊆ S2 and thus there exists p ∈ CS\T(v) ∩ CS[T(v). Therefore,
v(S ∩ T) + v(S ∪ T) = p(S ∩ T) + p(S ∪ T) = p(S) + p(T) ≥ v(S) + v(T),
which implies convexity of v.
3 Result
A game v is a capacity if it is non-negative (v(S) ≥ 0 for all S ∈ F), monotone (v(S) ≤
v(T) for S,T ∈ F with S ⊆ T), and normalized (v(Ω) = 1). An additive capacity is
called a probability measure.
For a capacity v, the Dempster-Shafer update for v given E ∈ F with v0(E) > 0 is a
capacity vE deﬁned as follows:
vE(S) =
v(S ∪ Ec) − v(Ec)
v0(E)
for all S ∈ F. (1)
The Dempster-Shafer update for a probability measure p is the Bayesian update:
pE(S) =





for all S ∈ F. (2)
3See Theorem 2 and Theorem 5 of Shapley (1971). See also Gibloa and Schmeidler (1993, p. 45).
2Let P be a collection of probability measures over Ω. The maximum likelihood update
for P given E ∈ F with p(E) > 0 for some p ∈ P is a collection PE of probability
measures deﬁned as follows:
PE = {pE : p ∈ argmax
q2P
q(E)}. (3)
Let v be a capacity and let P = C(v). We say that the Dempster-Shafer rule and
the maximum likelihood rule are equivalent for v if
vE(S) = min
pE2PE
pE(S) for all E,S ∈ F with v0(E) > 0. (4)
Note that it is part of the condition (4) that the set PE is non-empty and the minimizer
exists.
Gibloa and Schmeidler (1993) have shown the following result.
Proposition 3 If v is convex, then the Dempster-Shafer rule and the maximum likeli-
hood rule are equivalent for v.
The following is the main result of this paper.
Proposition 4 If the Dempster-Shafer rule and the maximum likelihood rule are equiv-
alent for v, then v is convex.
Proof. Assume that (4) holds. Observe that (4) implies CS(v)  = ∅ for all S ∈ F.





p(S) = vΩ(S) = v(S) for all S ∈ F, (5)




p(E) = 1 − min
p2P
p(Ec) = 1 − v(Ec) = v0(E).
This implies that, for p ∈ P,
p ∈ argmax
q2P
q(E) ⇔ p(E) = v0(E) ⇔ p(Ec) = v(Ec) ⇔ p ∈ CEc(v). (6)
So (3) can be re-written as follows:
PE = {pE : p ∈ CEc(v)}. (7)
3Hence, for any E,S ∈ F with v0(E) > 0, we have




pE(S) (by (1) and (4))
= min
p2CEc(v)
p(S ∪ Ec) − p(Ec)
p(E)
(by (2) and (7))
=
minp2CEc(v) p(S ∪ Ec) − v(Ec)
v0(E)
(by (6)).
Comparing the ﬁrst and the last expressions, we have
v(S ∪ Ec) = min
p2CEc(v)
p(S ∪ Ec).
This implies that there exists p ∈ C(v) satisfying both p(Ec) = v(Ec) and p(S ∪ Ec) =
v(S ∪Ec), or equivalently, CEc(v)∩CS[Ec(v)  = ∅ for all E,S ∈ F with v0(E) > 0. Now
note that v0(E) = 0 holds if and only if v(Ec) = 1, which implies that v(Ec∪S) = 1 and
thus CEc(v) ⊆ CEc[S(v) for all S ∈ F. Consequently, we have CEc(v) ∩ CS[Ec(v)  = ∅
for all E,S ∈ F, or setting S1 = Ec and S2 = Ec ∪ S, we have CS1(v) ∩ CS2(v)  = ∅ for
all S1,S2 ∈ F with S1 ⊆ S2. This implies convexity of v by Lemma 2.
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